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We are pleased that our article has stimulated such thoughtful discussion,
and we appreciate the discussants’ interest in exploring the methodological
and practical points of our study. The discussants make a number of excellent
points worthy of future investigation and highlight the difficulty of making
accurate statistical estimates of the likelihood of rare events in general, and
of large terrorist events in particular. Our study is certainly not the final
word on these topics and we look forward to future developments in these
areas. In our rejoinder, we focus on selected points that will clarify the
context of our study and open questions, including the choice of statistical
models that are consistent with reasonable mechanistic models for the data
under study, and the value of simple models in controlling uncertainty in
complex social systems.
Not all tail models are equal. Two key motivations in our use of the power-
law or simple Pareto tail model were (i) its previous use in modeling terror-
ist event severities, and (ii) its status as the only tail model with published
mechanisms for the frequencies of large terrorist events. Although the de-
bate is ongoing as to which mechanism, if any, is the correct explanation
for the observed heavy-tailed pattern in event severities [see Clauset and
Gleditsch (2012) for discussion], these mechanisms provide an important
theoretical grounding for any statistical modeling of terrorism’s upper tail.
Without such mechanisms, there is little theoretical justification for favoring
one particular tail model over another to estimate extreme event probabili-
ties. Thus, we believe some amount of priority should be given to estimates
derived from distributions like the power law, which have articulated and
plausible underlying mechanisms for terrorist event severities. However, the
surest way to reduce our ultimate uncertainty as to the likelihood of future
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large events is to identify and test alternative mechanisms for the heavy-
tailed pattern in terrorist event severities, and we look forward to new work
in that direction.
Disagreement among tail models. The statistical framework we presented
is entirely general and can thus be used in conjunction with (i) any well-
defined, automatic method for identifying the upper tail region, and (ii)
any well-defined probabilistic model of an upper tail. (Although we modeled
severities as i.i.d. random variables, this is not a requirement, and a clear
understanding of the statistical correlations among terrorist events at the
global scale could, in principle, be incorporated into a more detailed model.)
Given these choices, data-driven estimates are then produced.
Even without regard to their theoretical motivation, not all tail models
are reasonable choices in this framework. Any model can be fitted to the
data, but if it is a poor fit, we are under no obligation to trust its results.
How then should we decide which models are good fits? The models used
in our analysis (power law, log-normal and stretched exponential) were all
previously demonstrated, under a combination of standard hypothesis tests
and likelihood ratio tests, to meet this criteria [Clauset, Shalizi and Newman
(2009)]. Of course, more flexible models, like the generalized Pareto distri-
bution (GPD), the tapered Pareto or a piecewise Pareto, may also provide
reasonable fits, as several discussants suggested. The difficulty, however, is
how to interpret or reconcile models that produce conflicting estimates for
the likelihood of a large event, and how to choose among models with dif-
ferent levels of flexibility.
Modern statistics does not offer clear answers to these questions because
of the role played by xmin, the smallest value for which the tail model holds.
Unlike traditional model parameters, changing xmin changes the sample size,
which confounds changes in statistical power with the usual bias-variance
trade-off. The result is an additional risk in overfitting, particularly with
flexible models like those suggested by the discussants, as larger values of
xmin are considered. Simple models, like the power-law distribution, would
seem to offer some protection against this risk. (We note that this problem
of identifying reasonable tail models is ubiquitous in complex social sys-
tems with heavy-tailed variables, including financial markets [Farmer and
Lillo (2004), Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011)].) The method we
used to choose xmin has reasonable properties and performs well in practice
[Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009)]. New research on how best to choose
xmin for out-of-sample forecasts and how to rigorously compare models es-
timated from differently sized samples would help resolve some of these
difficulties.
Conclusions. The statistical modeling and forecasting of terrorist event
severity is a relatively new endeavor that combines interesting methodolog-
ical problems and tricky forms of uncertainty in an application area with
REJOINDER 3
arguably genuine practical benefit. There are many interesting and impor-
tant questions worthy of study, and the discussants have identified a number
of them. Better estimates and a deeper understanding of the pattern of large
terrorist events and the mechanisms that produce them can inform our ex-
pectations (as with large natural disasters) of how many such events will
occur over a long time horizon and how to appropriately anticipate or re-
spond to them.
In closing, we note that the relatively smooth distribution of the sizes of
terrorist events worldwide presents a puzzle. Given the highly contingent na-
ture of individual events and individual conflicts, 9/11 being an outstanding
example, how can the global distribution be so regular? This striking pattern
suggests both that accurate estimates of the probability of large events may
be derived from modeling the relative frequency of much less severe events
and that some aspects of global terrorism may not be as contingent or un-
predictable as is often assumed. Understanding the origin of this global-level
pattern, and the mechanisms by which local-level dynamics give rise to it, is
itself an important research direction with real implications for understand-
ing the fundamentals of violent political conflict. We look forward to new
insights in these directions.
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